Escalation in conflict games: on beliefs and selection
研究了动态产权冲突博弈中，玩家行为动机异质性如何通过学习和信念更新导致努力升级，并用实验验证了类型异质性、信念形成与更新、自我选择及后期努力升级。
Abstract We study learning and selection and their implications for possible effort escalation in a simple game of dynamic property rights conflict: a multi-stage contest with random resolve. Accounting for the empirically well-documented heterogeneity of behavioral motives of players in such games turns the interaction into a dynamic game of incomplete information. In contrast to the standard benchmark with complete information, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium features social projection and type-dependent escalation of efforts caused by learning. A corresponding experimental setup provides evidence for type heterogeneity, for belief formation and updating, for self-selection and for escalation of efforts in later stages.