The effect of a worldwide tax system on tax management of foreign subsidiaries
研究全球税制是否降低跨国公司对海外子公司进行税务管理的动机，发现从全球税制转向属地税制后，跨国公司降低了海外子公司的有效税率，表明全球税制下企业面临竞争劣势。
Abstract Under a worldwide tax system, firms pay taxes on their domestic income and repatriated foreign income, whereas under a territorial tax system repatriated foreign income is exempt from taxation. We examine whether worldwide tax systems reduce the incentives of multinational corporations to engage in tax management in their foreign subsidiaries. Using two quasi-natural experiments, we show that multinationals lower the effective tax rates in their foreign subsidiaries after countries switch from a worldwide to a territorial tax system. Thus, multinationals subject to a worldwide tax system face competitive disadvantages compared to competitors from countries with a territorial tax system.