Firm Reputation, Innovation and Employee Startups
研究企业奖励创新员工的声誉如何影响内部创新和员工创业，发现低价值创新在内部开发，高价值创新通过创业实现，模型预测与观察到的员工创业规律一致。
Abstract This article studies how a firm’s reputation for rewarding innovative employees affects innovation and startup creation. In any Pareto-efficient equilibrium of the repeated game, low-value innovations are developed in-house, while high-value innovations are developed in startups. When distributions of ideas are ordered by simple cases of first- or second-order stochastic dominance, the firm has a preference for an extreme distribution. The article also characterises the optimal relational contract and workers’ incentives to invest in innovation. The model’s predictions are consistent with a broad set of observed regularities regarding the creation of employee startups.