VOTING AND SOCIAL PRESSURE UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION
研究在大型两党选举中，自利且策略性的选民如何通过网络形成协调博弈来奖励同伴，解释了不完全信息下投票行为为何依赖朋友行动，以及适度隐私对维持虚伪但有用的社会压力的必要性。
Abstract We develop a model in which costly voting in a large, two‐party election is a sequentially rational choice of strategic, self‐interested players who can reward fellow voters by forming stronger ties in a network formation coordination game. The predictions match a variety of stylized facts, including explaining why an individual's voting behavior may depend on what she knows about her friends' actions. Players have imperfect information about others' voting behavior, and we find that some degree of privacy may be necessary for voting in equilibrium, enabling hypocritical but useful social pressure. Our framework applies to any costly prosocial behavior.