The Optimal Tariff, Production Lags and Time Consistency
指出，当生产决策先于消费决策时，大国的最优关税在事前和事后弹性不同，导致时间不一致问题；若大国无法承诺事前最优关税，所有国家福利都会受损，而若对国内进口竞争品征税则能改善福利。
The optimal tariff for a large country equals the reciprocal of the foreign export elasticity of supply. However, if production decisions occur before consumption decisions, the ex ante optimal tariff is not time consistent because the ex post elasticity is less than the ex ante elasticity. We show all countries are worse off if the large country cannot precommit to its ex ante optimal tariff, and that all countries can gain if the large country taxes domestic production of importables.