The Design of Procurement Contracts
研究采购项目中竞标与分批购买之间的相互作用，从成本最小化采购方的角度分析，证明在不完全竞争下多源采购优于单一来源，且激励合同优于成本加成或固定价格合同。
This paper investigates the interaction between bidding for procurementprograms and fractional buys. This problem is analyzed from the standpoint of a cost-minimizing procuring agent. It is shown that underimperfect competition, a multiple-source purchase is generally preferred to a single-source contract. Similarly, the author demonstrates that a (strictly) intermediate cost sharing arrangement, i.e., an incentive contract, dominates either the cost-plus or the firm-fixed price arrangements. Copyright 1986 by American Economic Association.