A Theory of Holdouts in Wage Bargaining
提出工会利用僵持（合同到期后继续谈判）作为获取行业其他谈判结果信息的拖延策略，模型预测僵持时长与同时谈判的合同数量正相关，且同一谈判组内僵持时长趋同。加拿大制造业数据支持这些预测。
Holdouts (the continuation of negotiations beyond the contract expiry date) are the most common form of disputes in labor contract negotiations. The authors model holdouts as a delaying tactic employed by unions to obtain information about other bargaining outcomes in their industry. Novel implications of their model include a positive association between holdout duration and the number of bargaining pairs negotiating contracts simultaneously; bunching of holdout durations within these 'negotiating groups'; and fewer strikes among holdouts which end later in groups. Using a large panel of contract negotiations in Canadian manufacturing, the authors find considerable support for these predictions. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.