Influence Activities, Coalitions, and Uniform Policies: Implications for the Regulation of Financial Institutions
研究了代理人如何组建游说联盟影响政策制定者，发现政策统一性导致搭便车和联盟形成，且联盟形成方式对游说活动和政策强度的影响是非单调的，对金融机构监管有启示。
We examine a setting in which agents can form lobbying coalitions to influence a policy maker. Policy uniformity causes agents to free ride on each other’s lobbying and gives them an incentive to form lobbying coalitions. We investigate when coalitions are formed by similar or dissimilar agents and show that endogenous coalition formation causes the effects of policy uniformity and lobbying costs on aggregate lobbying activity and policy strength to be nonmonotonic. Our model suggests that increased competition in the market for coalition-facilitating lobbyists can lead to less lobbying. We discuss implications for the regulation of financial institutions. This paper was accepted by Shiva Rajgopal, accounting.