Optimal certification policy, entry, and investment in the presence of public signals
研究了认证中介的最优信息披露政策，其中卖方决定是否进入市场及投资产品质量，买方观察到额外的公共质量信号。最优政策通过权衡进入与投资激励来最大化从卖方抽取的租金，并识别了完全、部分或不披露为最优的条件。
Abstract We explore the optimal disclosure policy of a certification intermediary where (i) the seller decides on entry and investment in product quality, and (ii) the buyers observe an additional public signal on quality. The optimal policy maximizes rent extraction from the seller by trading off incentives for entry and investment. We identify conditions under which full, partial or no disclosure can be optimal. The intermediary's report becomes noisier as the public signal gets more precise, but if the public signal is sufficiently precise, the intermediary resorts to full disclosure. However, the social welfare may reduce when the public signal becomes more informative.