Improving decisions with market information: an experiment on corporate prediction markets
通过实验室实验，研究了企业预测市场中不同市场设计对管理者决策的影响，发现理论上更优的设计在实际中表现不佳，但加入自上而下的建议后两种设计效果相近。
Abstract We conduct a lab experiment to investigate an important corporate prediction market setting: A manager needs information about the state of a project, which workers have, in order to make a state-dependent decision. Workers can potentially reveal this information by trading in a corporate prediction market. We test two different market designs to determine which provides more information to the manager and leads to better decisions. We also investigate the effect of top-down advice from the market designer to participants on how the prediction market is intended to function. Our results show that the theoretically superior market design performs worse in the lab—in terms of manager decisions—without top-down advice. With advice, manager decisions improve and both market designs perform similarly well, although the theoretically superior market design features less mis-pricing. We provide a behavioral explanation for the failure of the theoretical predictions and discuss implications for corporate prediction markets in the field.