Social Connectivity, Media Bias, and Correlation Neglect
研究有偏见的报纸如何影响选民投票，发现社交连接增强时，若先验支持政府则提高效率，否则降低效率，且即使连接很大也无法完全实现有效结果。
Abstract A biased newspaper aims to persuade voters to vote for the government. Voters are uncertain about the government’s competence. Each voter receives the newspaper’s report as well as independent private signals about the competence. Voters then exchange messages containing this information on social media and form posterior beliefs, neglecting correlation among messages. We show that greater social connectivity increases the probability of an efficient voting outcome if the prior favours the government; otherwise, efficiency decreases. The probability of an efficient outcome remains strictly below one even when connectivity becomes large, implying a failure of the Condorcet jury theorem.