Get the Money Somehow: The Effect of Missing Performance Goals on Insider Trading
研究发现，未达相对业绩目标的CEO会通过内幕交易获取更高异常收益，并减少盈利和销售指引，表明内幕交易可弥补薪酬损失，削弱绩效薪酬的激励效果。
This paper uses a regression discontinuity design to identify the effect of compensation shocks on insider trading. I find that CEOs who narrowly miss relative performance goals and hence suffer a loss in compensation subsequently earn higher abnormal profits from their insider trades than otherwise similar CEOs who narrowly beat the goals. I also find that CEOs who narrowly miss relative performance goals become less likely to provide earnings and sales guidance. These results suggest that managers can use insider trading to make up for the loss in compensation due to missing relative performance goals, which could reduce the incentive effect of performance-based pay.