Differences in CEO compensation under large and small institutional ownership
研究了2006-2015年美国数据中大型和小型机构投资者对CEO薪酬不同组成部分的影响，发现大型机构持股增加会降低总薪酬和短期激励，而小型机构则降低长期激励，且效果在治理弱、现金流多的公司更强。
Abstract I examine the influence of large and small institutional investors on different components of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, using US data for 2006–2015. An increase in large institutional ownership reduces total pay and current incentive compensation (i.e., options, stocks, bonus pay), whereas small institutional investors lower long‐term incentive pay (i.e., pension, deferred pay, stock incentive pay). These findings are consistent with managerial agency theory and the substitution of incentive pay by institutional monitoring. The effects are stronger for higher ownership levels and firms with weak governance, less financial distress, long‐tenured CEOs, multiple segments, and more free cash flow.