Trust, regulation, and contracting institutions
证明信任直接影响契约效率，信任减少对契约监管的需求并与高质量契约环境正相关，支持替代假说；在监管薄弱的国家，信任可补充正式执行，随着监管增强，信任替代监管。
Abstract This paper demonstrates that trust directly influences contracting efficiency. We document that trust reduces demand for contract regulation and positively relates to a high‐quality contracting environment, supporting a substitution hypothesis. Furthermore, contract regulation no longer leads to poor contracting outcomes. These findings suggest that lack of trust significantly explains inefficient contracting institutions. Based on interaction effects, we note that trust could complement formal enforcement in countries with weak regulation. As regulation increases, trust substitutes for contract regulation. Overall, trust positively promotes efficient contracting by reducing burdensome regulation and providing an alternative to formal contract enforcement.