Relationship Trading in Over‐the‐Counter Markets
研究了保险公司与交易商在OTC公司债券市场中的交易关系网络，发现网络规模与执行价格呈非单调关系，并构建模型解释这一现象，反事实分析表明拆分交易与非交易服务的监管可能降低福利。
ABSTRACT We examine the network of trading relationships between insurers and dealers in the over‐the‐counter (OTC) corporate bond market. Regulatory data show that one‐third of insurers use a single dealer, whereas other insurers have large dealer networks. Execution prices are nonmonotone in network size, initially declining with more dealers but increasing once networks exceed 20 dealers. A model of decentralized trade in which insurers trade off the benefits of repeat business and faster execution quantitatively fits the distribution of insurers' network size and explains the price–network size relationship. Counterfactual analysis shows that regulations to unbundle trade and nontrade services can decrease welfare.