Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance
研究了首都城市与冲突、治理质量的关系，发现冲突更可能发生在首都附近，而孤立的首都与治理不善相关，且这一结果仅适用于非民主国家和政府类内部冲突。
We investigate the links between capital cities, conflict, and the quality of governance, starting from the assumption that incumbent elites are constrained by the threat of insurrection, and that the latter is rendered less effective by distance from the seat of political power. We show evidence that (i) conflict is more likely to emerge (and dislodge incumbents) closer to the capital, and (ii) isolated capitals are associated with misgovernance. The results hold only for relatively nondemocratic countries and for intrastate conflicts over government (as opposed to territory)—exactly the cases where our central assumption should apply.