CURRENCY UNION WITH OR WITHOUT BANKING UNION
构建了一个包含信用的两国货币模型，研究货币一体化与信用市场一体化如何相互作用，发现高跨境信用成本下货币一体化可能加剧信用配给、降低福利，而信用市场一体化能恢复货币联盟的最优性。
Abstract We build a symmetric two‐country monetary model with credit to study the interplay between currency integration and credit markets integration. The currency arrangement affects credit availability through default incentives. We capture credit markets integration by the extra cost incurred to obtain credit for cross‐border transactions and, with the euro area context in mind, label as banking union a situation where this cost is low. For high levels of the cross‐border credit cost, currency integration may magnify default incentives, leading to more credit rationing and lower welfare. The integration of credit markets restores the optimality of the currency union.