Uncertainty, Risk, and Incentives: Theory and Evidence
研究了盈利不确定性如何通过“干中学”效应正向影响高管激励，与传统的风险-激励负向权衡相反，并提供了实证支持。
Uncertainty has qualitatively different implications than risk in studying executive incentives. We study the interplay between profitability uncertainty and moral hazard, where profitability is multiplicative with managerial effort. Investors who face greater uncertainty desire faster learning, and consequently offer higher managerial incentives to induce higher effort from the manager. In contrast to the standard negative risk-incentive trade-off, this “learning-by-doing” effect generates a positive relation between profitability uncertainty and incentives. We document empirical support for this prediction. This paper was accepted by Wei Jiang, finance.