ENTRY DECISIONS AND ASYMMETRIC COMPETITION BETWEEN NON‐PROFIT AND FOR‐PROFIT HOMES IN THE LONG‐TERM CARE MARKET
利用德国行政数据，研究非营利与营利养老院之间的战略互动，发现同类竞争更强、产品存在差异，且政策模拟显示政府政策变化对市场覆盖影响显著。
Abstract Demand for long‐term care services is growing strongly. Using a rich administrative data set for Germany, we examine strategic interaction between nonprofit and for‐profit nursing homes. The estimated competitive effects imply that competition is much stronger within type, suggesting that they provide differentiated products. Over time, the entry behavior of for‐profit homes has converged to that of the more established nonprofits and between‐type competition has become stronger. Counterfactual simulations of proposed changes in government policy indicate that even moderate changes have a large impact on the fraction of markets that remain unserved or only served by a single type.