Experimental Cost of Information
研究了信息获取成本的两种主要表示方法：基于实验的成本和基于后验信念分布的成本，发现后者在许多情况下与原始实验成本模型不一致，并指出基于实验的方法有助于解决理性疏忽在博弈和均衡分析中的局限性。
We relate two main representations of the cost of acquiring information: a cost that depends on the experiment performed, as in statistical decision theory, and a cost that depends on the distribution of posterior beliefs, as in applications of rational inattention. We show that in many cases of interest, posterior-based costs are inconsistent with a primitive model of costly experimentation. The inconsistency is at the core of known limits to the application of rational inattention in games and, more broadly, in equilibrium analyses where beliefs are endogenous; we show that an experiment-based approach helps to understand and overcome these difficulties.