Shareholder coordination and corporate innovation
研究发现机构投资者的地理邻近性衡量的股东协调程度与企业创新成果正相关，这种关系由具有强监督动机的专注和独立机构驱动，在股权集中度低、信息不对称高的企业中更显著。
Abstract We show that greater shareholder coordination, as proxied by the geographic proximity between institutional investors, is positively related to corporate innovation outcomes. This relationship is driven by coordination among dedicated and independent institutions who have strong monitoring incentives and is more pronounced among firms with lower blockholder ownership and greater information asymmetry where there is greater benefit to monitoring. We propose that shareholder coordination promotes corporate innovation through a reduction in managerial agency problems. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that greater shareholder coordination enables diffuse shareholders to monitor managers more effectively and enhances corporate innovation.