UNIQUE MARKOV EQUILIBRIUM UNDER LIMITED COMMITMENT
提出一种递归方法，刻画有限承诺且偿付约束不太紧的竞争均衡，证明唯一强遍历马尔可夫均衡是约束有效的，适用于宏观经济学和动态契约研究。
Abstract I develop a recursive method for the characterization of competitive equilibrium under limited commitment with not‐too‐tight solvency constraints. The reputational mechanism is fragile, as it sustains constrained efficiency as well as a large set of constrained inefficient equilibria. However, I establish that the only strongly ergodic Markov equilibrium with trade is constrained efficient. The method relies on a planning program along with the theory of monotone concave operators. It is suitable for other applications to macroeconomics and dynamic contracts.