The Impact of Governmental Intervention on the Association Between Initial Public Offering and Future Stock Issuance
研究了中国背景下首次公开募股特征如何影响后续增发决策，发现政府干预（通过国有持股、政治关联高管和开发区）会削弱IPO与SEO之间的正向关系，归因于国家与中小股东的利益冲突。
Abstract We examine the effect of initial public offering (IPO) characteristics on seasoned equity offering (SEO) decisions in relation to governmental intervention in China. Our results confirm the process of underpriced IPOs in promoting earlier and larger SEOs in the Chinese context. The study examines three channels through which the Chinese government intervenes in equity issuance activities, namely state ownership, politically connected executives and economic development areas. We find that the connection between IPOs and SEOs becomes less apparent in government‐intervened firms. We attribute these results to the conflict between the state and minority shareholders, which leads to high uncertainty and risk in government‐intervened firms.