Social Status Concerns and the Political Economy of Publicly Provided Private Goods
研究当人们关心社会地位时，公共提供私人物品的政治经济学，发现地位动机会使富人投票支持公共提供，导致多数投票结果可能只有少数人使用公共部门，且公共部门使用者可能享受比私人系统更好的服务。
Abstract We analyse the political economy of the public provision of private goods when individuals care about their social status. Status concerns motivate richer individuals to vote for the public provision of goods they themselves buy in markets: a higher provision level attracts more individuals to the public sector, enhancing the social exclusivity of market purchases. Majority voting may lead to a public provision that only a minority of citizens use. Users in the public sector may enjoy better provision than users in the private system. We characterise the coalitions that can prevail in a political equilibrium.