On the Effects of Linking Cap-and-Trade Systems for $$\hbox {CO}_{2}$$ Emissions
分析了在巴黎协定各国自主贡献的背景下，连接国家间总量控制与交易体系对二氧化碳排放许可价格的影响，并给出了简化表达式和数值例子。
Abstract Linkage of national cap-and-trade systems is typically advocated by economists on a general analogy with the beneficial linkage of free-trade areas and on the specific grounds that linkage will ensure cost effectiveness among the linked jurisdictions. The paper analyses the less obvious effects of linkage with the bottom–up approach of the Paris Agreement where each country sets its nationally determined contribution for its own carbon dioxide ( $$\hbox {CO}_{2}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:msub><mml:mtext>CO</mml:mtext><mml:mn>2</mml:mn></mml:msub></mml:math> ) emissions. An appropriate and widely accepted specification for the damages of $$\hbox {CO}_{2}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:msub><mml:mtext>CO</mml:mtext><mml:mn>2</mml:mn></mml:msub></mml:math> emissions within a relatively short (say 5–10 year) period is that marginal damages for each jurisdiction are constant (although they can differ among jurisdictions). With this defensible assumption, the analysis is significantly clarified and yields simple closed-form expressions for all $$\hbox {CO}_{2}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:msub><mml:mtext>CO</mml:mtext><mml:mn>2</mml:mn></mml:msub></mml:math> permit prices. Some implications for linked and unlinked voluntary $$\hbox {CO}_{2}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:msub><mml:mtext>CO</mml:mtext><mml:mn>2</mml:mn></mml:msub></mml:math> cap-and-trade systems are derived and discussed. A numerical example illustrates the results.