Optimal Contracts with Randomly Arriving Tasks
研究了工人任务随机变化对长期雇佣合同结构的影响，发现简单的任务时间变化就能产生基于晋升的动态，工人偶尔获得永久加薪并减少未来工作要求。
Abstract Workers are rarely assigned to perform the same task throughout their career. Instead, their assignments may change randomly over time to comply with the fluctuating needs of the organisation where they are employed. In this article, we show that this typical randomness in workplaces has a striking effect on the structure of long-term employment contracts. In particular, simple intertemporal variability in the worker’s tasks is sufficient to generate a rich promotion-based dynamics in which, occasionally, the worker receives a (permanent) wage raise and his future work requirements are reduced.