Competition in network industries: Evidence from the Rwandan mobile phone network
利用卢旺达移动电话网络的交易数据，估计消费者效用并模拟竞争政策对福利和投资的影响，发现提前引入竞争者可使福利增加相当于GDP的1%。
Abstract This article analyzes the potential for competition policy to affect welfare and investment in a network industry. When a network is split between competitors, each internalizes less network effects, but may still invest to steal customers. I structurally estimate consumers' utility from adopting and using mobile phones, with transaction data from nearly the entire Rwandan network. I simulate the equilibrium choices of consumers and network operators. Adding a competitor earlier could have reduced prices and increased incentives to invest in rural towers, increasing welfare by the equivalent of 1% of GDP. However, forcing free interconnection can lower incentives to invest.