Societal Trust and Management Earnings Forecasts
研究了社会信任水平如何影响管理层自愿发布盈利预测的决策，发现高信任国家的管理者更倾向于发布预测，且预测更精确准确，对理解制度环境与信息披露的关系有参考价值。
ABSTRACT We investigate the relationship between societal trust and managers' decisions to voluntarily issue earnings forecasts. We reason that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts in high-trust countries than in low-trust countries because investors view these voluntary disclosures as more credible information about the firm's future profitability. We find evidence consistent with these predictions, suggesting that societal trust fosters corporate voluntary disclosure. We also document that societal trust works as a substitute for country-level formal institutions in terms of its implications for management earnings forecast (MEF) issuance. Additionally, we find a stronger relationship between firm-level commitment to credible disclosure and MEFs in low-trust countries, suggesting that country-level societal trust relates to the effectiveness of firm-level credibility-enhancing mechanisms. Finally, we show that firms from countries with higher societal trust issue more precise and accurate MEFs that contain more information about multiple items.