Promotion Signaling and Human Capital Investments
研究在信息不对称的劳动力市场中，晋升如何作为能力信号导致低效的晋升决策，并进一步影响人力资本投资方向，发现若可承诺则投资偏向企业特定人力资本，否则投资选择常是有效的。
In a world characterized by asymmetric learning, promotions can serve as signals of worker ability, and this, in turn, can result in inefficient promotion decisions. If the labor market is competitive, the result will be practices that reduce this distortion. We explore how this logic affects human capital investment decisions. We show that, if commitment is possible, investments will be biased toward the accumulation of firm-specific human capital. We also consider what happens when commitment is not possible and show a number of results including that, if investment choices are not publicly observable, choices are frequently efficient.