A Single-Judge Solution to Beauty Contests
证明选美竞赛模型的均衡政策规则等价于单代理人对经济基本面的预测，该预测基于修正的信息过程，仅通过战略互补程度折减异质冲击的精度。结果适用于任何线性高斯信号过程，并扩展到网络博弈，为求解复杂信息结构模型提供了简便方法。
We show that the equilibrium policy rule in beauty contest models is equivalent to that of a single agent’s forecast of the economic fundamental. This forecast is conditional on a modified information process, which simply discounts the precision of idiosyncratic shocks by the degree of strategic complementarity. The result holds for any linear Gaussian signal process (static or persistent, stationary or nonstationary, exogenous or endogenous), and also extends to network games. Theoretically, this result provides a sharp characterization of the equilibrium and its properties under dynamic information. Practically, it provides a straightforward method to solve models with complicated information structures.