How Unsecured Credit Policies Influence Mortgage and Unsecured Loan Defaults
研究了金融危机前后家庭在抵押贷款和无担保贷款上违约顺序的变化，并分析了无担保信贷政策对两类贷款违约率的影响，发现提高无担保贷款违约成本可降低两者违约率。
Abstract Before the global financial crisis, the proportion of households defaulting on the mortgage while remaining current on the unsecured loan was almost the same as the proportion of households current on the mortgage but defaulting on the unsecured loan. After the crisis, the former ratio became higher than the latter. By using a heterogeneous agent model with the mortgage and the unsecured loan, I examine how the order of defaults changed before and after the crisis. I then analyze the impacts of unsecured credit policies on households' mortgage and unsecured loan defaults. My quantitative exercise shows that both default rates can decrease as the cost for unsecured loan defaults increases.