COMMUNICATION AND MARKET SHARING: AN EXPERIMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF SOFT AND HARD INFORMATION
通过多市场古诺寡头实验，研究企业间交换硬信息（过去行为的可验证信息）和软信息（未来行为的非约束信息）对合谋的影响，发现软信息大幅推高价格，对反垄断监管有启示。
Abstract We study the role of communication in collusive market sharing. In a series of Cournot oligopoly experiments with multiple markets, we vary the information that firms can exchange: hard information—verifiable information about past conduct—and soft information—unbinding information about future conduct. We find that the effect of communication on the firms' ability to collude depends on the type of information available: Whereas market prices increase only slightly with hard information, the price raise due to soft information is substantial. Our results point to the types and contents of communication that should be of particular concern to antitrust authorities.