Bargaining over Contingent Contracts under Incomplete Information
研究了在私人信息事后可验证时，双方就或有合同进行讨价还价的两阶段博弈，刻画了摩擦消失时均衡极限的特征，并证明其属于Myerson的公理化解。
We study bargaining over contingent contracts in problems where private information becomes public or verifiable when the time comes to implement the agreement. We suggest a simple, two-stage game that incorporates important aspects of bargaining. We characterize equilibria in which parties always reach agreement, and study their limits as bargaining frictions vanish. Under mild regularity conditions, we show all interim-efficient limits belong to Myerson’s (1984) axiomatic solution. Furthermore, all limits must be interim efficient if equilibrium beliefs satisfy no-signaling-what-you-don’ t-know. Results extend to other bargaining protocols.