Agenda-Manipulation in Ranking
研究了委员会在集体决定备选方案排名时，投票顺序可能被操纵的问题，发现了一种名为插入排序的议程策略，能让自利的委员会主席在不知投票结果时也能达到完全知情时的效果。
Abstract We study the susceptibility of committee governance (e.g. by boards of directors), modelled as the collective determination of a ranking of a set of alternatives, to manipulation of the order in which pairs of alternatives are voted on—agenda-manipulation. We exhibit an agenda strategy called insertion sort that allows a self-interested committee chair with no knowledge of how votes will be cast to do as well as if she had complete knowledge. Strategies with this “regret-freeness” property are characterized by their efficiency, and by their avoidance of two intuitive errors. What distinguishes regret-free strategies from each other is how they prioritize among alternatives; insertion sort prioritizes lexicographically.