Positional preferences and efficiency in a dynamic economy
在内生增长模型中研究了消费和财富的位置偏好何时不导致效率损失，并推导了最优税收政策，区分了福利主义与非福利主义政府，比较了地方竞争与全球最优资源配置。
Abstract In an endogenous growth model, we characterize the conditions under which positional preferences for consumption and wealth do not cause inefficiency and derive an optimal tax policy response in cases where these conditions are not satisfied. The concerns for relative consumption and relative wealth partly emanate from social comparisons with people in other countries. We distinguish between a (conventional) welfarist government and a non-welfarist government that does not attach any social value to relative concerns. We also compare the outcome of Nash-competition among local/national governments with the resource allocation implied by a global social optimum both under welfarism and non-welfarism.