The Welfare Consequences of Mixed Environmental Policy Instruments with Voluntary Provision
利用德克萨斯州电力行业数据，评估自愿限额交易与强度标准混合监管框架的福利后果，发现混合政策主要惠及小容量高减排成本机组，而强制性限额交易配合再分配政策可实现帕累托改进。
This article evaluates the welfare consequences of a mixed regulatory framework with a voluntary cap‐and‐trade program and intensity standards using data from the Texas electricity industry. I construct and estimate a structural model of the compliance choices of power generating units to recover their abatement costs. Then I simulate for the counterfactual equilibrium under a mandatory cap‐and‐trade regulation. Results show that the mixed policy framework mainly benefits generating units with small capacity and high abatement costs. However, a mandatory cap‐and‐trade regulation with redistribution policies could bring in substantial Pareto improvement.