Pollution, mortality and time consistent abatement taxes
在新古典代际交叠增长模型中，污染损害健康但可通过税收资助的减排来缓解。研究发现，时间一致的减排税收在低资本水平下为零，随后随资本存量弱递增，并导致多重稳态和稳定性反转。
We study dynamically consistent policy in a neoclassical overlapping generations growth model where pollution externalities undermine health but are mitigated via tax-financed abatement. With arbitrarily constant taxation, two steady states arise: an unstable ‘poverty trap’ and a ‘neoclassical’ steady state near which the dynamics might either be monotonically convergent or oscillating. When the planner chooses a time consistent abatement path that maximizes a weighted intergenerational sum of expected utility, the optimal tax is zero at low levels of capital and then a weakly increasing function of the capital stock. The non-homogeneity of the tax function along with its feedback effect on savings induces additional steady states, stability reversals and oscillations.