单人猜数游戏:均衡行为、信念与最优反应之间关系的诊断

The one player guessing game: a diagnosis on the relationship between equilibrium play, beliefs, and best responses

Experimental Economics · 2020
被引 17
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

通过单人猜数游戏实验,分离了理解游戏规则和形成他人行为信念两个维度,发现多数被试不理解游戏结构,而理解更好的被试信念更准、反应更优。

Abstract

Abstract Experiments involving games have two dimensions of difficulty for subjects in the laboratory. One is understanding the rules and structure of the game and the other is forming beliefs about the behavior of other players. Typically, these two dimensions cannot be disentangled as belief formation crucially depends on the understanding of the game. We present the one-player guessing game, a variation of the two-player guessing game (Grosskopf and Nagel 2008), which turns an otherwise strategic game into an individual decision-making task. The results show that a majority of subjects fail to understand the structure of the game. Moreover, subjects with a better understanding of the structure of the game form more accurate beliefs of other player’s choices, and also better-respond to these beliefs.

单玩家猜数游戏博弈理解信念形成最优反应