Would depositors pay to show that they do not withdraw? Theory and experiment
在Diamond-Dybvig金融中介模型中，允许存款人付费向后续存款人公开宣布不取款，理论上仅此选项就能消除银行挤兑均衡。实验室实验发现人们广泛使用这种公告来协调避免挤兑，有公告时取款率更低。
Abstract In a Diamond–Dybvig type model of financial intermediation, we allow depositors to announce at a positive cost to subsequent depositors that they keep their funds deposited in the bank. Theoretically, the mere availability of public announcements (and not its use) ensures that no bank run is the unique equilibrium outcome. Multiple equilibria—including bank run—exist without such public announcements. We test the theoretical results in the lab and find a widespread use of announcements, which we interpret as an attempt to coordinate on the no bank run outcome. Withdrawal rates in general are lower in information sets that contain announcements.