The sophistication of conditional cooperators: Evidence from public goods games
通过改变博弈的经济激励，发现约四分之一的参与者是“强”条件合作者，他们遵循复杂规则：仅在匹配贡献能提升整体福利时才这样做，支持基于社会规范遵从的解释。
We extend the study of behavioural types in voluntary contribution games, adapting the elicitation method of Fischbacher et al. (2001) to a broader range of economic and strategic incentives. Our results in the standard VCM game align with previous findings in many respects; in particular, we identify one-quarter of participants as a distinctive group of “strong” conditional cooperators. We provide an explanation for the behaviour of this group by tracking their contribution strategies as the financial incentives of the game vary. We find that conditional cooperators follow a sophisticated rule, matching contributions only when doing so leads to an overall welfare improvement. This favours an account of conditional cooperation based on social norm compliance, rather than confusion, inequity aversion, or warm-glow giving.