Monetary Policy When Preferences Are Quasi‐Hyperbolic
研究了经济主体具有准双曲线贴现时，央行如何通过货币政策控制通胀，发现若央行不采用家庭的时间偏好，小幅增加稳态产出会以更高平均通胀为代价，且家庭现时偏向会导致资产回报率大幅上升。
Abstract We study discretionary monetary policy in an economy where economic agents have quasi‐hyperbolic discounting. We demonstrate that a benevolent central bank is able to keep inflation under control for a wide range of discount factors. If the central bank, however, does not adopt the household's time preferences and tries to discourage early consumption and delayed saving, then a marginal increase in steady‐state output is achieved at the cost of a much higher average inflation rate. We show that the present bias produced when households have quasi‐hyperbolic discounting causes asset returns to rise substantially; in general equilibrium, the magnitude of hyperbolic discounting found in experimental studies would lead to enormous and wildly counterfactual levels for asset returns. We contrast our results with those obtained when policy is conducted according to a Taylor‐type rule and to those obtained when households and the central bank discount geometrically.