Endogenous Monitoring in a Partnership Game
研究了在不完美监督导致无法维持合谋的重复博弈中，引入自利监督者获取私人信号并发送公开信息，发现低监督成本下可存在合谋均衡，且合谋均衡对监督者更有利。
I consider a repeated game in which, due to imperfect monitoring, no collusion can be sustained. I add a self-interested monitor who commits to obtain private signals of firms’ actions and sends a public message. The monitor makes an offer specifying the precision of the signals obtained and the amount to be paid in return. First, with a low monitoring cost, collusive equilibria exist. Second, collusive equilibria are monitor-preferred. Third, in monitor-preferred equilibria, firms’ payoffs are decreasing in the discount factor. My model helps explain cartel agreements between self-interested parties and firms in legal industries in the United States and Europe.