Salience and Accountability: School Infrastructure and Last-Minute Electoral Punishment
研究阿根廷2015年总统选举中，投票站学校基础设施质量如何影响选民对现任市长候选人马克里的支持，发现较差设施降低其得票率，尤其在低收入和有学龄儿童家庭地区更明显。
Abstract Can seemingly unimportant factors influence voting decisions by making certain issues salient? We study this in the context of Argentina’s 2015 presidential elections by examining how the infrastructure quality of the school where citizens voted influenced their choice. Exploiting the quasi-random assignment of voters to ballot stations in public schools in Buenos Aires, we show that individuals assigned to poorer infrastructure schools were less likely to vote for Mauricio Macri, the incumbent mayor running for president. The effect is larger in lower-income areas, where private education is more unusual, and in places where more households have children of school-going age.