Political connections in the land market: Evidence from China's state‐owned enterprises
研究发现中国国有企业在土地拍卖中比私营企业多支付11.9%的溢价，主要由全资国企驱动，原因是国企能提前获取国家级经济开发区土地开发信息，且购地后股价表现正面；反腐运动削弱了政治关联和信息优势，降低了溢价。
Abstract This study examines whether political connections lead state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) to behave differently from privately owned enterprises (POEs) in acquiring land parcels at auctions and explores the underlying mechanisms that drive the price premiums paid by SOEs. We find that SOEs pay 11.9% more than POEs for observably comparable land parcels at auctions, and the price premiums SOEs pay are mainly driven by wholly state‐owned enterprises (WSOEs). In particular, we provide evidence that SOEs have advance access to information about the development of land parcels in 134 state‐level special economic zones, and land parcels purchased by SOEs lead to positive stock market performance. We also show that an anti‐corruption campaign that weakens political connections and reduces the information advantage leads to a decrease in the price premiums paid by SOEs.