Nondogmatic Social Discounting
针对长期社会贴现率的争议，提出非教条主义社会规划者理论，这些规划者承认自身判断可能改变，从而在长期贴现率上达成一致，有助于解决规范分歧，尤其适用于长期公共项目评估。
The long-run social discount rate has an enormous effect on the value of climate mitigation, infrastructure projects, and other long-term public policies. Its value is however highly contested, in part because of normative disagreements about social time preferences. I develop a theory of “nondogmatic” social planners, who are insecure in their current normative judgments and entertain the possibility that they may change. Although each nondogmatic planner advocates an idiosyncratic theory of intertemporal social welfare, all such planners agree on the long-run social discount rate. Nondogmatism thus goes some way toward resolving normative disagreements, especially for long-term public projects.