Persuasion Through Selective Disclosure: Implications for Marketing, Campaigning, and Privacy Regulation
研究企业或政治竞选者如何根据个体偏好选择性披露信息来说服消费者或选民，并分析竞争程度、消费者警惕性和价格歧视对福利的影响，为隐私法规设计提供参考。
This paper models how firms or political campaigners (senders) persuade consumers and voters (receivers) by selectively disclosing information about their offering depending on individual receivers' preferences and orientations. We derive positive and normative implications depending on the extent of competition among senders, whether receivers are wary of senders collecting personalized data, and whether firms are able to personalize prices. We show how both senders and receivers can benefit from selective disclosure. Privacy laws requiring senders to obtain consent to acquire personal information that enables such selective disclosure increases receiver welfare if and only if there is little or asymmetric competition among senders, if receivers are unwary, and if firms can price discriminate. This paper has been accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.