Bank Monitoring and Financial Reporting Quality: The Case of Accounts Receivable–Based Loans*
利用新型应收账款贷款数据，研究账龄报告贷款契约对借款人应收账款报告质量的影响，发现此类要求显著提升了报告质量，尤其在借款人议价能力较弱时。
ABSTRACT Using novel receivable‐based loan data, we study the effect of aging‐report loan covenants on borrowers' accounts receivable reporting quality. Our purpose is to highlight a channel that lenders use to obtain private information and to understand whether lenders' information acquisition affects the financial reporting quality of borrowers. Compared to receivable‐based borrowers without aging‐report requirements (control firms), borrowers with such requirements (test firms) increase their receivable reporting quality significantly after loan initiations. The shift in reporting quality is more pronounced when borrowers have weak bargaining power. Our results lend support to the argument that lender information access affects borrowers' reporting quality.