Oligopolistic equilibrium and financial constraints
研究了动态双头垄断中企业可能将对手挤出市场的情形，发现某些参数下古诺均衡无法维持，存在混合策略马尔可夫完美均衡导致企业退出，破产考虑下合谋产出更高且更有利于高效企业。
Abstract We model a dynamic duopoly in which firms can potentially drive their rivals from the market. For some parameter values, the Cournot equilibrium outcome cannot be sustained in an infinitely repeated setting. In those cases, there is a Markov perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies in which one firm, eventually, will exit the market with probability one. Producer surplus in the maximum collusive outcome is greater under bankruptcy consideration, because the outcome that maximizes joint profits is skewed in favor of the more efficient firm. Consumer surplus and social welfare also increase in many cases, although those effects are generally ambiguous.