DECENTRALIZED ONE‐TO‐MANY BARGAINING
研究一个主动玩家与多个被动玩家如何分配合作剩余，主动玩家可自由选择谈判顺序，发现均衡收益的上下界，并检验两种常见顺序规则能否内生维持。
Abstract We study a one‐to‐many bargaining model in which one active player bargains with every passive player on how to share the surplus of a joint project. The order of bargaining is not fixed and the active player decides whom to bargain with in each period. Our model admits a rich set of equilibria and we identify the upper and lower bounds of equilibrium payoffs. We also examine whether two natural ordering protocols often assumed in existing studies can sustain endogenously. Although the queuing protocol may indeed arise in an equilibrium, the rotating protocol is in general not self‐enforcing.