Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
提出稳定性比较应满足的三个基本性质，证明在单位容量下，顶级交易循环机制是所有有效且防策略机制中不稳定性最小的，并扩展至非单位容量情形。
In the context of priority-based allocation of objects, we formulate methods to compare assignments in terms of their stability. We introduce three basic properties that a reasonable stability comparison should satisfy. We show that for any stability comparison satisfying the three properties, the top trading cycles mechanism is minimally unstable among efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms when objects have unit capacities. Our unifying approach covers basically all natural stability comparisons and establishes the robustness of a recent result by Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2020). When objects have nonunit capacities, we characterize the capacity-priority structures for which our result is preserved.